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Abstract
We analyze the eﬀects of neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks
on hours and output. Long cycles in hours are captured in a variety of ways.
Hours robustly fall in response to neutral shocks and robustly increase in
response to investment speciﬁc shocks. The percentage of the variance of
hours (output) explained by neutral shocks is small (large); the opposite is
true for investment speciﬁcs h o c k s .‘ News shocks’ are uncorrelated with the
estimated technology shocks.
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11 Introduction
There has been a renewed interest in empirically examining the eﬀects of technology
shocks on total per-capita hours following the work of Galí (1999, 2005), Christiano
et. al. (2003), Uhlig (2004), Francis and Ramey (2005) and, more recently, Dedola
and Neri (2007). This interest is typically motivated by the fact that the dynamics of
hours diﬀer if such disturbances occur in a basic RBC model (where hours increase)
or in a basic sticky-price model (where hours decrease). Unfortunately, the available
evidence is, at best, mixed and its interpretation controversial.
This state of aﬀairs is due, in part, to the complicated task that applied re-
searchers face. First, technology shocks are identiﬁed using long run restrictions
(see e.g. Galí (1999)). However, it is know that identiﬁc a t i o nv i al o n gr u nr e s t r i c -
tions is weak, in the sense of Faust and Leeper (1997), and available samples may be
too short or unstable to credibly impose such restrictions (see Erceg, et. al. (2005)).
Furthermore, other primitive shocks may have similar long run features as technol-
ogy shocks (see Uhlig (2004)). Second, diﬀerent types of technological disturbances
may have diﬀerent eﬀects on hours, making the outcomes of standard bivariate mod-
els, where only one generic technology shock is identiﬁed, uninterpretable (see Fisher
(2006) and Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007)). Third, as recently emphasized by
Canova, et.al. (2006) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2007), the choice of price deﬂators may
matter for correctly recovering the eﬀects of technological disturbances. Fourth, the
response of hours appears depends on a number of auxiliary statistical assumptions,
including the treatment of long cycles in hours, the lag length of the empirical model
and the horizon at which the identifying restrictions are imposed. Finally, the recent
evidence provided by Beaudry and Portier (2005), where generic shocks that change
expectations about the future (which they call ‘news shocks’) are the same as the
identiﬁed technology shocks, makes the interpretation of the latter problematic.
This paper empirically examines the eﬀects of technology on hours and output
addressing these issues in an uniﬁed and comprehensive manner. In particular, we
remove long cycles in hours in a number ways; we separately analyze the dynamics
induced by two diﬀerent technology shocks (neutral and investment speciﬁc) and
examine their relationship with other shocks identiﬁed in the literature. We also
2deal with the potential misspeciﬁcation created by VARs with a limited number of
variables and a ﬁnite number of lags and study the robustness of the conclusions to
alternative identiﬁcation schemes and diﬀerent measures for the price deﬂators.
We ﬁnd that once we remove long cycles in hours, all the other pieces of the
puzzle become irrelevant; regardless of the lag length, the choice of price deﬂators,
the identiﬁcation scheme, the presence of omitted variables and other auxiliary sta-
tistical assumptions one is forced to make in specifying the VAR, hours robustly fall
in response to neutral shocks while they robustly increase in response to investment
speciﬁc shocks. We also ﬁnd that the contribution of neutral shocks to hours ﬂuc-
tuations is small, while the contribution of investment speciﬁcs h o c k si ss u b s t a n t i a l .
Interestingly, the relative importance of the two shocks for output ﬂuctuations is
reversed: neutral shocks explain about twice as much as investment speciﬁcs h o c k s
of the forecast error variance of output at all horizons.
Estimated neutral shocks have peaks and troughs which occur in correspondence
of NBER peaks and throughs, while investment speciﬁcs h o c k sf a i lt od i s p l a ys i g -
niﬁcant cyclical features. Our technology shocks are uncorrelated with potentially
important omitted variables; they do not stand in for other likely sources of distur-
bances; are unrelated to the news shocks of Beaudry and Portier (2005), and diﬀer
from the technology shocks one would extract from accounting exercises.
Our results complement and qualify several other contributions in the literature.
Regarding the issue of long cycles in hours and how should be dealt with in the VAR,
two contrasting arguments are typically made. If one conditions the analysis on the
models used to interpret the results–Christiano et. al. (2003), Uhlig (2004), Dedola
and Neri (2007) –per-capita hours should enter the empirical model in level, since
basic RBC and New-Keynesian models produce stationary hours ﬂuctuations, even
when technology is non-stationary. If one conditions the analysis on the statistical
properties of the data and follows a classical statistical approach –Galí (1999), and
Francis and Ramey (2005) –the VAR should include hours in diﬀerences. Figure 1,
which shows that the standard per-capita hours series displays long but essentially
stationary cycles. These cycles are of longer duration than those considered in the
business cycle literature and may reﬂect e.g. demographics, long run trends in labor
market participation or R&D activities. This paper argues that disregarding them
3(as one would do by taking hours in levels) or by taking a rough short cut (as one
would do by diﬀerencing the series) lead to misspeciﬁcation, eﬃciency losses, and
potentially uninterpretable results. Our point of view therefore leads to conclusions
which are diﬀerent from those by Francis and Ramey (2005) who, in order to justify
as p e c i ﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences for hours, argue that one should ﬁnd economic
reasons that lead to a unit root in per-capita hours.
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Figure 1: Per-capita hours, HP(λ =6 4 0 0 ) and low pass estimates.
Fernald (2007) has also stressed the importance of characterizing shifts in the
variables of the VAR, in order to correctly recover the eﬀects of technology shocks on
hours. Relative to that paper, we emphasize that shifts do not necessarily appear in
the autocovariance function of hours; provide a robustness analysis - using various
measures of hours, diﬀerent speciﬁcation choices, medium versus long run restric-
tions, and several alternative detrending procedure; analyze the eﬀects on hours of
two diﬀerent types technology shocks; and examine the time series features of the
estimated technology shocks and their relationship with some interesting economic
shocks.
4Our evidence is hard to reconcile with simple ﬂexible price and sticky price mod-
els of the type advocated by Galí (2005) and Altig et al. (2005). Standard models
predict that the percentage of hours and output ﬂuctuations explained by technol-
ogy shocks should be similar. In Canova et al. (2006) we show that the sign and
magnitude of the output and hours responses to technology shocks we report here,
and the sign and magnitude of the unemployment and labor market ﬂows responses
we discuss in that paper, are instead consistent with a model of creative destruction,
where improvements in the neutral technology trigger adjustments along both the
intensive and the extensive margin of the labor market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically summarizes
the literature. Section 3 interprets the existing evidence and presents new results.
Section 4 examines the robustness of our ﬁndings. Section 5 discuses the properties
of the estimated technology shocks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The existing evidence
We summarize the current state of the debate in the context of a VAR with labor
productivity, the price of investment, both measured in consumption units and per-
capita hours. All variables are in logs. A trivariate speciﬁcation is the minimum
size system required to recover neutral and investment-speciﬁc shocks. Since such a
small model is liable to speciﬁcation errors, we show later how to check for potential
omitted variables. The sample runs from 1955:1 to 2000:4–a consistent price of
investment series is available only up to that date. We present results when all
three variables enter the VAR in ﬁrst diﬀerence (the diﬀerence system) and when
the ﬁrst two enter in ﬁrst diﬀerence and per-capita hours in levels (the level system).
Investment speciﬁcs h o c k sa r ei d e n t i ﬁed by the requirement that they are the sole
source of long run movements in the price of investment while neutral shocks can
aﬀect both labor productivity and the price of investment in the long run. Fisher
(2006) has shown how to derive these restrictions in models of both neoclassical and
New-Keynesian orientation where the neutral technology and the price of investment
are both stochastic and display a unit root. We use 12 lags of each variable in each
system and stochastically restrict their decay toward zero assuming that the prior
5variance of lag j is proportional to j−2. Rather than using a standard lag selection
criteria, we use a generous lag length and reduce overparametrization with a prior.
We choose this approach in order to avoid the problems emphasized by Giordani
(2004), Chari et. al. (2005), and Fernandez-Villaverde et. al. (2007), who show that
a subset of the variables generated by standard models may display decision rules
that are not always representable with a ﬁnite order VAR–a problem that may be
severe in a three equation system. Unless otherwise stated, the ﬁgures report the
point estimate of the dynamic responses and a 90 percent small sample conﬁdence
tunnel. When the point estimate lies outside or at the boundary of the tunnel, small
sample biases are likely to be important.
The ﬁrst two boxes of the ﬁrst row of ﬁgures 2 report the response of hours to a
neutral shock in the full sample. As documented in the literature, per-capita hours
positively respond to a neutral shock in the level system, the maximum response is
delayed by about 5 quarters and the instantaneous impact is insigniﬁcant. In the
diﬀerence system, per-capita hours fall for up to 4 quarters and settle to their long
run level from above, but responses are generally insigniﬁcant.
The sign diﬀerence in the point estimates obtained in the two speciﬁcations is
often attributed to long cycles in hours and to the fact that these movements distort
the conditional dynamics of the level system. However, long cycles do not necessarily
imply non-stationarity dynamics, as it is commonly assumed (see e.g. Galí (2005));
there could be stationary cycles with long but ﬁnite periodicity resulting in standard
overdiﬀerencing problems. In addition, since the diﬀerence speciﬁcation emphasizes
high frequency hours variability, the importance of measurement error could be
magniﬁed. Since the 90 percent tunnel for the diﬀerence system is large relative to
the one for the level system, this problem is likely to be important. Hence, both
systems are misspeciﬁed and it is diﬃcult to draw credible conclusions about the
conditional dynamics of hours from these two pictures.
One way to take care of long cycles in hours is to split the sample in pieces. We
follow Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997), Fernald (2007) and Canova et. al. (2006),
who have suggested that 1973:2 and 1997:1 could be crucial break dates, and we split
t h es a m p l ea c c o r d i n g l y . F r o mﬁgure 1 one can see that these are, approximately,
the dates at which the Hodrick Prescott estimate of the long cycles has ﬂex points.
6The dynamics of hours in response to neutral shocks are similar in the two
systems (see second and third rows of ﬁgure 2) and in both the 1955-1973 and 1973-
1997 samples, hours instantaneously fall. In the level system the point estimate is
persistently negative and signiﬁcantly so for a number of quarters; in the diﬀerence
speciﬁcation, the point estimate turns positive after just two quarters, but remain
insigniﬁcant at all horizons. Notice that if instead of the 1993-1997 sample we had
considered the 1973-2000 sample, we would have found that hours instantaneously
increase in both speciﬁcations even though the increase is signiﬁcant only in the





























































































































Figure 2: Responses of per-capita hours
7The responses of hours to investment shocks are depicted in the last two columns
of ﬁgure 2. For the full sample, the level and the diﬀerence speciﬁcations agree:
hours responses display a hump shaped pattern; the increase is instantaneously
signiﬁcant; and the magnitude of the eﬀect is roughly similar. When we split the
sample, results diﬀer across speciﬁcations. In the level system, hours insigniﬁcantly
fall in the 1955-1973 sample, and signiﬁcantly increase in the 1973-1997 and in the
1973-2000 samples. For the diﬀerence system, the point estimate is positive in all
three sub-samples, but responses are signiﬁcant only in the 1973-1997 sample.
The sub-sample instability found in the level system for both shocks may lead
researcher to believe that the relationship between per-capita hours and technol-
ogy shocks has changed over time. What is puzzling for this intepretation is that
no sub-sample instability is present in the diﬀerence speciﬁcation. Sub-sample ev-
idence, however, is diﬃcult to trust here because splitting the sample in pieces
introduces large small sample biases. Small sample bias make estimates unreliable
for three reasons. First, with small samples, tunnels become larger making point
estimates less informative (compare across rows in ﬁgure 2). Second, using long run
restrictions in a system estimated over a small sample is likely to induce distortions
in the structural estimates (see Erceg, et. al. (2005)). Third, small sample biases
m a yi n t e r a c ti na nu n p r e d i c t a b l ew a yw i t hm e a s u r e m e n ta n da g g r e g a t i o ne r r o r s ,
making sub-sample evidence uninterpretable. In sum, neither assuming unit roots
nor splitting the sample in pieces seems the best way to account for the long cycles
that per-capita hours display.
3 Long cycles and intercept heterogeneities
The instabilities and sign reversals one ﬁnds in the level speciﬁcation (columns 1 and
3o fﬁgure 2) and the substantial homogeneity but insigniﬁcance of the results with
the diﬀerence speciﬁcation (columns 2 and 4), are symptomatic of a particular type
of data heterogeneity. In particular, they indicate the presence of level shifts and the
need to properly account for them in order to pin down the sign of the conditional
dynamics induced by technology shocks. To see why this may be the case consider
the three clouds of points presented in the left-hand side box of ﬁgure 3 which
8are intended to represent the 1973-1997, the 1955-1973 and the 1997-2000 impact
relationship between neutral shocks (on the x axis) and per-capita hours (y axis),
respectively. Notice that in the ﬁrst sample, the intercept is positive and large. In
the second and third samples, the intercept is still positive but much smaller. In all
three samples, the slope of the relationship is negative and approximately constant.
It is clear that if we pool the ﬁrst and the third sample together (think of
this as the sub-sample 1973-2000) or the three samples together without taking into
account intercept heterogeneity, the slope of the relationship becomes positive. This
is exactly the pattern of contemporaneous responses we found in the level system:
in the 1955-1973 and 1973-1997 samples the response of hours to neutral shocks is
negative, in the 1973-2000 and in the full sample the response is positive. If we
diﬀerence the variables, we remove the eﬀects of the mean shifts, independently
of the sample. Hence, the slope of the relationship is estimated to be negative,
but uncertainty about its magnitude is large, possibly due to the magniﬁcation of
measurement errors (see right hand side box of ﬁgure 3).
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Figure 3: Interpretation of the evidence.
While mechanically it is clear how the pattern we observe in ﬁgure 2 can happen,
9it is worth describing why such an outcome is to be expected when analyzing the
relationship between technology shocks and hours. Take, for example, the sub-
samples 1973-1997 and 1973-2000. Here the diﬀerences in the sign of the hours
responses to technology shocks can be attributed to the higher level that average
productivity growth and hours experienced by the US during the productivity revival
of the late 90’s. If not properly accounted for, these shifts lead to biases in the
estimated responses because average changes in the rate of productivity growth
are at least partly identiﬁed as a series of neutral technology shocks. Thus, in
the sample 1973-2000, when productivity growth is higher on average than in the
1973-1997 sample, the speciﬁcation identiﬁes a series of positive neutral technology
shocks. Since in this period hours are also above average, a bias emerges.
If the situation described in ﬁgure 3 is correct, splitting the sample and trac-
ing out the responses separately in each of them is ineﬃcient, since there are little
changes in the structural relationship, and may make small sample biases large.
Hence, to eﬃciently take care of the long cycles in hours, we have considered several
options. In the ﬁrst case, the intercept in the per-capita hours equation is determin-
istically broken at 1973:2 and 1997:1 (the dummy speciﬁcation). In the second case,
the intercept is allowed to be a deterministic function of time (up to a third order
polynomial). In the third case, we clean the per-capita hours series with a one-sided
low-pass ﬁlter, which takes away cycles with periodicity higher than 52 quarters
(which are those displayed as low pass trend in ﬁgure 1). Finally, in the fourth case
the intercept drifts stochastically and potentially continuously over time. In this
latter case, we specify an autoregressive mean-reverting law of motion and we use
the Kalman ﬁlter to recursively estimate it. Note that in all speciﬁcations, the small
sample biases induced by the use of long run restrictions are considerably reduced,
since the full sample of quarterly data is now employed to project estimated VAR
coeﬃcients inﬁnitely far into the future.
We plot the responses of per-capita hours in these four speciﬁcations in ﬁgure 4.
The ﬁrst column refers to neutral shocks and the second to investment shocks. The
results are very robust across methods; per-capita hours fall in response to neutral
shocks and increase in response to investment speciﬁc shocks and the instantaneous
response is always signiﬁcant. Depending on the exact speciﬁcation, the fall in
10response to neutral shocks is either persistent (ﬁr s tr o w )o rt e m p o r a r y( n e x tt h r e e
rows). Note also that the hump after 4-5 quarters that was present in ﬁgure 2–





















































































Figure 4: Responses of hours, sample 1955-2000
The percentage of the variance of per-capita hours explained by the two shocks
is similar in the four speciﬁcations; neutral disturbances have negligible eﬀects on
per-capita hours at horizons varying between 8 and 24 quarters (the upper 95th
percentile of the distribution is always below 10 percent), while investment speciﬁc
11shocks explain between 30-50 percent of the variance of hours at these horizons (20-
30 percent with the time varying intercept speciﬁcation). Interestingly, this ordering
is reversed for output ﬂuctuations; neutral shocks explain on average about 35 per-
cent of output ﬂuctuations and investment speciﬁcs h o c k so n l ya b o u t1 8p e r c e n to f








































Figure 5: Variance decomposition, dummy speciﬁcation, 90 percent bands
Altig, et. al. (2005) have estimated the eﬀects of neutral and investment speciﬁc
shocks using our same identiﬁcation approach but a slightly diﬀerent sample (1959:1-
2001:4). They report that the contribution of both shocks to per-capita hours and
output volatility at business cycle frequencies is roughly the same (about 15 percent).
However, their numbers are percentages obtained on average at the business cycle
frequencies of the spectrum, while here we report percentages obtained on average
at business cycle horizons. Moreover, they neglect long cycles in hours, which we
show are key to understand the eﬀects of technology shocks.
One question of interest is whether there are instabilities in the responses of hours
to technology shocks with any of the speciﬁcations in ﬁgure 4. The sub-sample evi-
dence presented in ﬁgure 2 was unintepretable because of the potential interactions
between small sample biases and improper treatment of data heterogeneity. Clearly,
12small sample biases will not disappear. Nevertheless, to the extent that data het-
erogeneity is now properly taken into account, sub-sample analysis should be more
informative. For the sake of space, ﬁgure 6 reports results only for the dummy
speciﬁcation. The responses of per-capita hours to neutral shocks are now instan-
taneously negative in all sub-samples and responses are signiﬁcant and somewhat
persistent in the 1955-1973 and 1973-1997 samples. The responses to investment
speciﬁc shocks are positive and signiﬁcant in the 1973-1997 and 1973-2000 samples
and similar to those obtained in the full sample. For the 1955-73 sample, the re-
sponses are insigniﬁcant at all horizons. Hence, the relationship between per-capita

























































































Figure 6: Responses of hours, diﬀerent samples, dummy speciﬁcation
134R o b u s t n e s s
There are many dimensions along which the robustness of our conclusions could
be examined, making the combination of systems to be estimated quite large. We
divide our analysis into three parts. First, we study robustness with respect to
the choice of variables, their measurement, and the sample used. Second, we check
whether our technology shocks stand-in for omitted variables or other measurable
sources of disturbances. Third, we examine whether outcomes are sensitive to the
statistical assumptions we have made. Overall, our conclusions are quite robust.
For the sake of presentation, we only report results for the dummy speciﬁcation. As


















































































Figure 7: Responses of per-capita hours, Alternative measurements, Dummy
speciﬁcation, 1955-2000
In the systems we have run, labor productivity and the price of investment are
14measured in consumption units. However, as Canova et. al. (2006) have shown, if
foreign goods enter the consumption basket, long run movements in labor produc-
tivity can also be driven by external shocks. Since the output basket is less prone
to such problems, we have repeated estimation measuring either labor productivity
or both labor productivity and the price of investments in output units. The ﬁrst
row of ﬁgure 7 shows that the sign and shape of per-capita hours responses to both
shocks remain unchanged.
Next, we have repeated our exercises using the hours series of Francis and Ramey
(2006). This series displays less of a trend than the standard one but, it is still not
void of long cycles (see right box of ﬁgure 1). If we adjust the hours series, the labor
productivity series needs to be adjusted as well to make the analysis consistent.
However, given the similarities in the paths of the two hours series, the bias in labor
productivity introduced by the lack of adjustment is unlike to be important. The
second row of ﬁgure 7 shows that, indeed, the qualitative features of per-capita hours
responses are unaltered when this new series is used in the VAR.
A referee also suggested that the trend in the late 1990s in the hours series could
be the result of changes in working age population, and that the trend disappears
when the hours series is scaled by labor force participation rather than by working
age population. This alternative series does not match the object of reference in
the theoretical discussions, which focus on a comprehensive measure of aggregate
labor eﬀort (including labor force participation). Nevertheless, it is worth repeating
the estimation with it, since, while free of trends, such a series still displays long
cycles. As shown in the third row of ﬁgure 7, the main features of hours responses
are unchanged also with this measure.
Finally, all systems are estimated with data up at 2000:4 since the price of
investment series terminates at that date. We have managed to obtain a newly
constructed price of investment series, which splices the old series with new data on
the price of investment up to 2004:4. The fourth row of ﬁgure 7 shows that updating
the sample, produces no major changes in the estimated relationship.
In order to credibly claim that our analysis is informative about the relationship
between technology shocks and per-capita hours, it is important to make sure that
the estimated technology shocks are not standing-in for missing variables or other
15structural shocks. While we have allowed enough lags in each estimated speciﬁca-
tion, and this make structural residuals serially uncorrelated, it is always possible
that, in a three variable system, omitted variables play a role. For example, Evans
(1992) showed that Solow residuals constructed from production functions are cor-
related with a number of policy variables, therefore making responses to Solow
residuals shocks uninterpretable. To check whether omitted variables play a role,
we have correlated our two estimated technology shocks with a set of variables which
a large class of general equilibrium models driven by neutral and investment speciﬁc
shocks suggest as being jointly generated with the data we have used.
Neutral shocks





















Figure 8: Cross correlation structural shocks-omitted variables, dummy
speciﬁcation, 1955-2000
Figure 8 reports the cross-correlations of up to four leads and four lags of the
estimated technology shocks with three of these variables (consumption to output,
investment to output, and inﬂation), and the upper and lower limits of an asymptotic
95 percent conﬁdence tunnel for the null hypothesis of no cross-correlation. Clearly,
all three variables fail to be strongly correlated with the estimated shocks. This
16outcome is conﬁrmed by the results of bivariate Granger causality tests between
the three potentially omitted variables and the recovered technology shock; lags of
consumption to output, investment to output, and inﬂation do not help in predicting
structural residuals. Hence, it is very unlikely that omitted variables play a major
role in explaining the results.
We have also correlated our estimated technology shocks with oil price shocks,
federal funds futures (FFF) shocks and tax shocks. The eﬀective tax series is taken
from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce and is transformed into a quarterly series
using an interpolation routine. These disturbances are constructed as the residuals
of univariate regressions of each of the three variables on two lags. The cross-
correlations are small and never exceed 0.11 in absolute value when we consider up
to 4 lags and 4 leads of the disturbances. Hence, estimated technological shocks do






























































Figure 9: Contemporaneous response of hours, dummy speciﬁcation, 1955-2000
Another way to examine the potential eﬀect of omitted variables on the relation-
17ship between per-capita hours and technology shocks is to check the robustness of
the results to changes in the lag length. To the extent that omitted variables result
in VAR residuals with MA components, adding lags to the model should help to
attenuate the problem. We report median estimates and small sample bands for the
contemporaneous response of per-capita hours to the two shocks as the lag length
changes in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 9. It is clear that the sign of the responses is very
robust to the choice of lag length. Interestingly, when a short lag length is used, the
contemporaneous response to both shocks becomes greater in magnitude.
We have also checked whether the dynamics of hours are robust to the timing
and the type of identiﬁcation restrictions we use. Uhlig (2004) has forcefully argued
that disturbances other than technology shocks may have long run eﬀects on labor
productivity and that, in theory, there is no horizon at which technology shocks
fully account for the variability of labor productivity. This means that the tech-
nology shocks we have extracted may have little to do with technological change.
Beaudry and Portier (2005) found empirical evidence consistent with this interpre-
tation; technology shocks obtained with long run restrictions on productivity in
a bivariate system are strongly correlated with shocks that generically change ex-
pectations about the future (what they call news shocks). To study whether this
is a problem, we have imposed the restriction that investment speciﬁcs h o c k sa r e
t h es o l es o u r c eo ft h eﬂuctuations in the price of investment and that neutral and
investment speciﬁc shocks are solely responsible for the ﬂuctuations in labor pro-
ductivity at varying horizons. The second row of ﬁgure 9 shows the impact response
of per-capita hours as the horizon changes: the sign of the response is robust to the
horizon at which the restriction is imposed, and it is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations,
except for the neutral shock identiﬁed using horizons shorter than 3 quarters.
Long run restrictions are vacuous if the series they constrain are stationary
around some deterministic trend or simply nearly integrated. When this is the
case, one needs to devise alternative restrictions to identify the two shocks of inter-
est. Dedola and Neri (2007), for example, assume stationarity of VAR variables and
use sign restrictions derived from an RBC model to identify technology shocks. A
previous version of the paper has also examined the dynamics of per-capita hours in
responses to technology shocks identiﬁed via sign restrictions. None of the qualita-
18tive conclusions we reach is aﬀected by using this alternative identiﬁcation strategy.
In sum, if one takes the view that long cycles in per-capita hours can be char-
acterized with time varying VAR intercepts, and that these movements are nearly
orthogonal to the (stationary) short run dynamics of the series, all other important
speciﬁcation choices become irrelevant.
5 How do technology shocks look like?
Technology shocks are often hard to interpret, even more so when they are char-
acterized as a unit root process, since at each point in time the probability of a
technological regress is non-negligible even if a positive drift is allowed. This is
an event which, most likely, has never been experienced in the post WWII era in
d e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e s . W eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h es h o c k sw eh a v ee x t r a c t e da r el e s s
than the usual black-box disturbances, as they do not correlate with variables po-
tentially omitted from the speciﬁcation and they do not stand-in for other sources
of structural disturbances. We now study their properties in more details.
The ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 10 plots of the (smoothed) estimated technology shocks
together with NBER recession episodes (shaded areas). Three stark features are
evident. First, our neutral shocks display signiﬁcant cyclicality. In particular, the
series displays throughs which are typically coincident with start of NBER reces-
sions and peaks coincident with start of recoveries. Second, the pattern of ups and
downs in our investment shocks only partially coincides with the standard NBER
classiﬁcation. Third, if one excludes the 1975 episode, the volatility of the two shock
series is comparable.
Since the neutral disturbance features two deep throughs in 1975 and 1982 and,
on average, hours fall in response to neutral shocks, one may be led to conclude that
the two major post WWII recessions were periods where per-capita hours boomed!
Such a conclusion is incorrect since, as ﬁgure 1 shows, hours fall during these reces-
sions. To assess the role of the two technology shocks in shaping hours ﬂuctuations
in these episodes we present in ﬁgure 10 an historical decomposition exercise. Each
panel reports the actual series and the counterfactual series that would have been
generated since 1974:1 had only neutral or investment speciﬁc shocks being present.
19Three features are evident. First, the eﬀect of the two shocks on per-capita hours
depends on time and on the state of the economy. Second, neutral shocks gener-
ate minor ﬂuctuations in per-capita hours, except for the late 1990s. In particular,
they generate no ﬂuctuations in the 1975 recession and only a little fall in the 1982
recession. On the other hand, it is when per-capita hours peak that neutral shocks
induce opposite movements in the counterfactual hours series. Third, investment
speciﬁc shocks contribute to the fall in the 1975 and 1982 recessions, but a large





















































Figure 10: Technology shocks
Figure 11 also gives an indication of the nature of the two estimated technol-
ogy shocks. In fact, the counterfactual price of investment series that investment
speciﬁc shocks generate is practically identical to the observed price of investment
series and the counterfactual labor productivity series that neutral shocks generate
is practically identical to the observed labor productivity series. Hence, the two
technology shocks are simply univariate shocks to the growth rate of relative price







































Figure 11: Historical decomposition
We next analyze how these shocks relate to those extracted from standard ac-
counting exercises, which are often used as exogenous forces in calibrated models.
We construct Solow residuals shocks, using a Cobb-Douglas production function,
adjusting for capacity utilization, and standard estimates of the labor share. Us-
ing the deﬁnition of labor productivity and the production function, we have that
yt
nt =( utkt
nt )αAt ,w h e r eAt measures total factor productivity (TFP) , Nt is private
nonfarm business sector hours, ut is capacity utilization, and kt are capital services
(both of which are obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics). In the upper
left corner of ﬁgure 12 we plot neutral and TFP shocks obtained diﬀerencing the
estimated TFP series. It is clear that the correlation of the two series is low (the
maximum value occurs contemporaneously and it is only 0.19), that innovations in
the estimated TFP displays higher volatility (0.79 vs 0.53), that the majority of
this volatility is concentrated in the high frequencies of the spectrum, and that TFP
shocks are positive in some NBER recessions. Similar conclusions are obtained if we
sample annually our neutral shocks and compare them with the aggregate technol-
21ogy shocks of Basu et al. (2005); the contemporaneous correlation is somewhat lower
(0.10) but the ranking of volatilities is unchanged. Hence, if displaying the right
sign in major recessions and being coincident and in phase with the NBER indicator
is a plus, our neutral shocks have better features than standard TFP shocks.
Neutral and TFP shocks
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Figure 12: Technology shocks and other shocks
To compare our price investment shock series with an accounting series for dis-
turbances to the price of investment, we use the law of accumulation of capital
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + vtit, where vt is the inverse of the price of investment, quarterly
measures of the capital stock and of the available investment series. The accounting
series for disturbances to the price of investment is obtained by diﬀerencing the esti-
mated series for vt. The upper right corner of ﬁgure 12 plots the resulting series and
the estimated investment speciﬁc shocks. As it was the case with neutral shocks,
22the volatility of the accounting series is much higher than the volatility of our esti-
mated price of investment shock series (2.31 vs 0.40); the two series are positively
correlated at leads and lags (maximum eﬀect 0.3 at lag 4), but diﬀer considerably
in the last three NBER recessions.
Beaudry and Portier (2005) have shown that there is an almost perfect correlation
between technology shocks identiﬁed with long run restrictions in a bivariate model
with TFP and stock prices and what they call news shocks, i.e. shocks which
do not generate any contemporaneous eﬀects on TFP, but instantaneously aﬀect
stock prices. Are our two technological disturbances related to news shocks? We
graphically show the relationships in the second row of ﬁgure 12. It is clear that
the correlation between the two series is far from perfect and, if anything, they
move in opposite direction, especially at NBER recession dates. For example, in
the 1975 recession, news shocks are positive, while both our neutral and investment
speciﬁc shocks are negative. Even looking forward, news shocks do not capture
the dynamics of our two technological shocks. In fact, the regression line between
neutral and news shocks has a slope equal to -0.12 (with a t-statistic equals to -
3.03) and the slope does not change magnitude if we lag the news shock series up
to 16 quarters. The slope between investment speciﬁc shocks and news shocks is
-0.11 (with a t-statisitic equals to -3.15) and its magnitude falls if we lag the news
shock series up to 16 quarters. Hence, the relationship between technology shocks
a n dn e w ss h o c k si d e n t i ﬁed by Beaudry and Portier (2005) may be spurious. Once
p r o p e rt e c h n o l o g ys h o c k sa r ee x t r a c t e d ,n e w ss h o c k sh a v el i t t l et od ow i t ht h e m .
To conﬁrm this conclusion we perform two additional exercises. First, we exam-
ine whether adding stock prices to our three variable system changes the informa-
tional content of our technology shocks. As shown in the second row of ﬁgure 10,
adding stock prices to the system hardly changes the main features of our technolog-
ical disturbances. Second, we run two bivariate systems with stock prices and either
labor productivity or the price of investment and compare the structural shocks
with those obtained in our benchmark VAR. If the results by Beaudry and Portier
(2005) are due to the low dimension of the system, we should see the time series
properties of technology shocks to vary in bivariate systems. Indeed, the time series
properties of technology shocks do change substantially in bivariate systems (com-
23pare the ﬁrst and the third row of ﬁgure 10). Hence, news shocks correlate with
technology shocks only to the extent that the conditioning set is limited to lagged
measures of productivity (or the price of investment) and stock prices.
To sum up, neutral shocks show a marked cyclical pattern but, in general, they
have little to do with hours ﬂuctuations except in the late 1990s. Moreover, the neg-
ative hours response they induce occur primarily during non-recessionary episodes.
Investment speciﬁc shocks do not display strong cyclical features, but they induce
movements in per-capita hours in the direction one would expect, especially at re-
cession times. The technology shocks one extracts from a bivariate system, TFP
data and standard approaches are substantially diﬀerent from the shocks we have
obtained and there is no evidence that our shocks are related to news shocks.
S i n c eal a r g ep o r t i o no ft h eﬂuctuations in per-capita hours is not due to tech-
nology shocks, both on average and in speciﬁc historical episodes, what then drives
hours ﬂuctuations? Such a question is diﬃcult to answer with our trivariate sys-
tems, since the remaining shock captures all the sources of stationary disturbances
in productivity and, potentially, the eﬀects of all omitted stationary variables. Nev-
ertheless, an analysis of its features may shed light on its nature. It turns out
that such a shock is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the news shock
contemporaneously (estimate is -0.03 and t-statistic -2.47) and that the maximum
correlation is lagged 7 quarters (estimate is 0.20); it is also somewhat correlated
with oil shocks (maximum correlation is 0.17 with 7 leads of oil shocks) and with
FFF innovations (maximum correlation is 0.16 with 2 lags of FFF shocks), but it
is unrelated to inﬂation, to the consumption to output or the investment to output
ratios which may proxy for goods demand driven ﬂuctuations. We also ﬁnd that
this shock is quite cyclical; i.e. it displays throughs at major NBER recessions, and
induces positive per-capita hours and output responses.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The evidence this paper presents substantially qualiﬁes what is available in the liter-
ature. We show that the presence of long cycles in hours has little eﬀects on the sign
of the dynamic relationship between investment speciﬁc shocks and hours, while we
24conﬁrm it could drive the sign of the dynamic relationship between neutral shocks
and hours. We also show that neither diﬀerencing the hours series, nor splitting the
sample in pieces is the right approach to follow. The ﬁrst choice induces overdiﬀer-
encing and enhances the importance of measurement error; the second introduces
important small sample biases (and ineﬃciencies) in the estimation. Allowing the
intercept of the hours series in the VAR to vary over time is instead a much more
natural approach. In addition, given that the observed long cycles in hours are rel-
atively stable over time, low frequency movements in hours can not be generated by
permanent changes in taxes, in the relative importance of wealth and substitution
eﬀects or in the size of the government employment sector. This also suggests that
models should not necessarily provide economic reasons leading to a unit root in
per-capita hours as, for example, Francis and Ramey (2005) seem to argue.
In the literature, the empirical evidence on the relationship between per-capita
hours and technology shocks seems to depend on a number of speciﬁcation choices.
Our analysis shows that such an outcome is due to an inappropriate treatment of
the long cycles in hours. Once these cycles are taken care in any reasonable way,
the data robustly suggest a number of interesting facts which we believe are useful
for empirically distinguishing models of the business cycle. In particular:
• Per-capita hours fall in response to neutral shocks and increase in response to
investment shocks.
• Neutral shocks explain a small portion of per-capita hours ﬂuctuations and a
much larger portion of output ﬂuctuations; the opposite is true for investment
speciﬁcs h o c k s .
• The negative response of per-capita hours to neutral shocks primarily occurs
at non-recessionary times.
• Neutral shocks are more cyclical than investment speciﬁc shocks and display
upturns and downturns which match the NBER classiﬁcation.
• T h et e c h n o l o g ys h o c k sw er e c o v e ra r eu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t hn e w ss h o c k so rt e c h -
nology shocks extracted with accounting exercises.
25• Shocks other than technological disturbances are crucial in explaining the dy-
namics of per-capita hours since the mid-1950s.
Future research should try to relate these ﬁnding to theories of the business cycle
by simulating models and running trivariate VARs on similar sample sizes. Some
of our results may be hard to reconcile with standard models, both of ﬂexible price
and sticky price orientations. In particular, models with standard preferences and
production function may have hard time to generate diﬀerent signs and diﬀerent
magnitudes in hours in response to neutral and investment speciﬁc shocks. They
may also have a hard time to reproduce the relative size of hours (and output)
ﬂuctuations explained by the two technology shocks we found in the data. Canova,
et. al. (2006) instead discuss a model where improvements in the neutral technology
cause Schumpeterian creative destruction and trigger adjustments along both the
intensive and the extensive margins of the labor market. They show that once the
technology shocks extracted from the VAR are fed into such a model, the qualitative
and quantitative features of the responses of hours, unemployment, ﬁnding and
separation rates are accurately reproduced.
There are many other dimensions along which our work could be extended. First,
it would be interesting to try to explain what drives long cycles in hours. While
Comin and Gertler (2006) have made a step in that direction, much work still needs
to be done. Second, one could try to relate the dynamics of hours to the “Great
Moderation” literature (see e.g. Canova, et. al. (2007)). Gambetti (2005) has
attempted to do this by estimating an empirical model where the dynamic relation-
s h i p sa n dt h ev a r i a n c e so ft h es h o c k sa r ea l l o w e dt oc h a n g eo v e rt i m e . H ea r g u e s
that the relationship between technology shocks and hours displays a signiﬁcant
change since the late 1990’s, which could be consistent with the evidence presented
in ﬁgure 2, and which deserves further investigation. Finally, while most analyses
concentrate on the US, one would like to know if our evidence also holds across
countries. Since series for hours and the price of investment are hard to obtain for
m a n yc o u n t r i e st h i sm a yr e q u i r ec o n s i d e r a b l ew o r k .A l li na l l ,t h e s ee x t e n s i o n sh e l p
to provide a more complete picture of the dynamics induced by various technology
shocks and suggest ways to account for them with fully speciﬁed dynamic models.
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